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Israeli–Palestinian peace process

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Title: Israeli–Palestinian peace process  
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Subject: Israel, Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Palestinian National Authority, Zionism, Israeli–Palestinian peace process
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Israeli–Palestinian peace process

The peace process in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has taken shape over the years despite the ongoing violence which has prevailed since the beginning of the conflict.[1] Since the 1970s, there has been a parallel effort made to find terms upon which peace can be agreed to in both the Arab–Israeli conflict and in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Some countries have signed peace treaties, such as the Egypt–Israel (1979) and Jordan–Israel (1994) treaties, whereas some have not yet found a mutual basis to do so.

William B. Quandt

, in the introduction of his book Peace Process, says:

"Sometime in the mid-1970s the term peace process began widely used to describe the American-led efforts to bring about a negotiated peace between Israel and its neighbors. The phrase stuck, and ever since it has been synonymous with the gradual, step-by-step approach to resolving one of the world's most difficult conflicts. In the years since 1967 the emphasis in Washington has shifted from the spelling out of the ingredients of 'peace' to the 'process' of getting there. … Much of US constitutional theory focuses on how issues should be resolved – the process – rather than on substance – what should be done. … The United States has provided both a sense of direction and a mechanism. That, at its best, is what the peace process has been about. At worst, it has been little more than a slogan used to mask the marking of time."[2]

Since the 2003 Road map for peace, the current outline for a Palestinian–Israeli peace agreement has been a two-state solution.


  • Views of the peace process 1
    • Palestinian views on the peace process 1.1
    • Israeli views on the peace process 1.2
    • US views on the peace process 1.3
      • American Jewish views on the peace process 1.3.1
  • Major current issues between the two sides 2
  • Attempts to make peace 3
    • UN resolution 242 and the recognition of Palestinian rights 3.1
    • PLO acceptance of two-state solution 3.2
    • Peace efforts with confrontation states 3.3
    • Madrid (1991–93) 3.4
    • Oslo (1993–) 3.5
    • 1996–99 agreements 3.6
      • Hebron agreement 3.6.1
      • Wye River Memorandum 3.6.2
    • Camp David 2000 Summit 3.7
    • Clinton's "Parameters" and the Taba talks 3.8
    • Beirut summit 3.9
    • The "Road Map" for peace 3.10
    • Israeli–Palestinian talks in 2007 and 2009 3.11
    • 2010 direct talks 3.12
    • 2013–14 talks 3.13
    • Abbas' peace plan 3.14
  • Alternative peace proposals 4
  • Some difficulties with past peace processes 5
  • Joint economic effort and development 6
  • Arab–Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties 7
  • See also 8
  • Notes 9
  • References 10
  • External links 11

Views of the peace process

Palestinian views on the peace process

Palestinians have held diverse views and perceptions of the peace process. A key starting point for understanding these views is an awareness of the differing objectives sought by advocates of the Palestinian cause. 'New Historian' Israeli academic Ilan Pappe says the cause of the conflict from a Palestinian point of view dates back to 1948 with the creation of Israel (rather than Israel’s views of 1967 being the crucial point and the return of occupied territories being central to peace negotiations), and that the conflict has been a fight to bring home refugees to a Palestinian state.[3] Therefore, this for some was the ultimate aim of the peace process, and for groups such as Hamas still is. However Slater says that this ‘maximalist’ view of a destruction of Israel in order to regain Palestinian lands, a view held by Arafat and the PLO initially, has steadily moderated from the late 1960s onwards to a preparedness to negotiate and instead seek a two-state solution.[4] The Oslo Accords demonstrated the recognition of this acceptance by the then Palestinian leadership of the state of Israel’s right to exist in return for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[5] However, there are recurrent themes prevalent throughout peace process negotiations including a feeling that Israel offers too little and a mistrust of its actions and motives.[3][6] Yet, the demand for the right of return by the Palestinian refugees to Israel has remained a cornerstone of the Palestinian view and has been repeatedly enunciated by Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas who is leading the Palestinian peace effort.[7]

Israeli views on the peace process

There are several Israeli views of the peace process. The official position of the State of Israel is that peace ought to be negotiated on the basis of giving up some control of the occupied territories in return for a stop to the conflict and violence.[8] Israel insists that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas be her negotiating partner for peace, not Hamas due to its continued attacks on the Israeli civilian population.[9] The Oslo Accords and the Camp David 2000 summit negotiations revealed the possibility of a two state system being accepted by Israeli leadership as a possible peace solution.

However, the violence of the second intifada and the political success of Hamas (a group dedicated to Israel's destruction)[10] have convinced many Israelis that peace and negotiation are not possible and a two state system is not the answer.[5] Hardliners believe that Israel should annex all Palestinian territory, or at least all minus the Gaza Strip.[5] Israelis view the peace process as hindered and near impossible due to terrorism on the part of Palestinians and do not trust Palestinian leadership to maintain control.[5] In fact, Pedahzur goes as far as to say that suicide terrorism succeeded where peace negotiations failed in encouraging withdrawal by Israelis from cities in the West Bank.[11] A common theme throughout the peace process has been a feeling that the Palestinians give too little in their peace offers.

US views on the peace process

There are divergent views on the peace process held by US officials, citizens and lobbying groups. All recent US Presidents have maintained a policy that Israel must give up some of the land that it conquered in the 1967 war in order to achieve peace;[12] that the Palestinians must actively prevent terrorism; and that Israel has an unconditional Palestinian state out of most of the current Palestinian territories, based on the idea of self-determination for the Palestinian people,[13] and President Obama has continued that policy.[14] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton thought that peace can only be achieved through direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.[15] Obama outlined the pursuit of the two-state solution as American policy for achieving Palestinian aspirations, Israeli security, and a measure of stability in the Middle East.[16]

American Jewish views on the peace process

According to the sociologist Mervin Verbit, American Jews are "more right than left" on peace process issues. Verbit found that surveys of American Jews often reflect the view of the poll's sponsors. Often it is the wording of the survey questions that bias the outcome (a headline illustrating this point reads "ADL poll shows higher support for Israel than did survey by dovish J Street"). Using survey data from the American Jewish Committee where findings could not be attributed to wording biases, Verbit found American Jews took a rightward shift following the collapse of the Camp David talks in 2000, and the 9/11 attacks in 2001.[17]

Major current issues between the two sides

There are numerous issues to resolve before a lasting peace can be reached, including the following:

From the Israeli perspective, a key concern is security, and whether the major Palestinian figures and institutions are in fact trying to fight terrorism and promote tolerance and co-existence with Israel. Israeli concerns are based on abundant documentary and empirical evidence of many Palestinian leaders having in fact promoted and supported terrorist groups and activities. Furthermore, there is much concrete evidence of Palestinians having supported and expressed incitment against Israel, its motives, actions, and basic rights as a state. The election of Hamas has provided evidence for this view, with the Hamas charter stating unequivocally that it does not recognize Israel's right to exist.[18] However, there remain some activists on the Palestinian side who claim that there are still some positive signs on the Palestinian side, and that Israel should use these to cultivate some positive interactions with the Palestinians, even in spite of Hamas's basic opposition to the existence of the Jewish State. Since mid-June 2007, Israel has cooperated with Palestinian security forces in the West Bank at unprecedented levels, thanks in part to United States-sponsored training, equipping, and funding of the Palestinian National Security Forces and Presidential Guard.[19]

A further concern is whether, as a result of this security argument, Israel will in fact allow the Palestinian community to emerge as a viable and sovereign political unit, a viable and contiguous state. There are also various economic and political restrictions placed on Palestinian people, activities, and institutions which have had a detrimental effect on the Palestinian economy and quality of life.[20] Israel has said repeatedly that these restrictions are necessary due to security concerns, and in order to counteract ongoing efforts which promote terrorism which incite opposition to Israel's existence and rights as a country. The key obstacle therefore remains the Israeli demand for security versus Palestinian claims for statehood.[21]

Furthermore, the identification of 'Palestinian' with 'terrorist' can be construed as problematic, and Sayigh argues that this association is used as a rationale for maintaining the status quo, and that only by recognising the status of Jewish immigrants as 'settlers' can we conceptually move forwards [22] However, it is the case that the Palestinian resort to militancy has made such conceptual clarity difficult to achieve.

Nevertheless, there is a range of ulterior motives for Israel's denial of Palestinian statehood. If Palestine were declared a state, then immediately, Israel, by its present occupation of the West Bank will be in breach of the United Nations Charter. Palestine, as a state, could legitimately call upon the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter to remove Israel from the occupied territories. Palestine, as a state, would be able to accede to international conventions and bring legal action against Israel on various matters. Palestine could accede to various international human rights instruments, such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It could even join the International Criminal Court and file cases against Israel for war crimes. It would be a tinderbox of a situation that is highly likely to precipitate conflict in the Middle East.[23]

There is a lively debate around the shape that a lasting peace settlement would take (see for example the One-state solution and Two-state solution). Authors like Cook have argued that the one-state solution is opposed by Israel because the very nature of Zionism and Jewish nationalism calls for a Jewish majority state, whilst the two-state solution would require the difficult relocation of half a million Jewish settlers living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.[24] The Palestinian leaders such as Salam Fayyad have rejected calls for a binational state or unilateral declaration of statehood. As of 2010, only a minority of Palestinians and Israelis support the one-state solution.[25] Interest in a one-state solution is growing, however, as the two-state approach fails to accomplish a final agreement.[26][27]

Attempts to make peace

UN resolution 242 and the recognition of Palestinian rights

After the

  • Israel-Palestinian Negotiations, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • The Reut Institute
  • BBC News - History of Mid-East peace talks
  • Palestinian-Israeli Relations,
  • "Netanyahu's two-state mask has slipped" by Henry Siegman
  • "The Arab-Israeli Peace Process Is Over. Enter the Era of Chaos" by Lee Smith
  • "Netanyahu lowers expectations for Israeli-Palestinian peace" by Lahav Harkov
  • A presentation of the Lubavitcher Rebbe's views on the Jewish people's connection with the Holy Land, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the so-called "Land for Peace" issue
  • The Israel Project: Timeline of Israeli-Arab Peace Initiatives since 1977
  • The History of the Peace Process in the Context of the 2013 John Kerry Peace Efforts Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Palestinian Territories August, 2013
  • Beyond Intractability: A Free Knowledge Base on More Constructive Approaches to Destructive Conflict
  • The Jerusalem Fund Resources

External links

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  4. ^ Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, pp. 171-199, p. 176.
  5. ^ a b c d Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, pp. 171-199.
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  59. ^ Tessler, Mark A. "A History of the Israeli-Palestinian ...." Google Books. Originally published in 1994. 1 January 2011. p. 718. "Inhabitants of the occupied territories and other Palestinians had shown interest in a two-state solution since the mid-1970s, and the mainstream of the PLO had since the 1982 Arab summit."
  60. ^ Abu Toameh, Khaled. "Abbas: Land swap principle reached".  
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  67. ^ Ravid, Barak (29 July 2013). "Obama welcomes renewal of Israeli-Palestinian talks, but says 'hard choices' lie ahead". Haaretz. Retrieved 7 February 2014. 
  68. ^ "Hamas rejects Kerry's announcement: Abbas has no authority to negotiate". Ynet. 20 July 2013. Retrieved 23 July 2013. 
  69. ^ Booth, William (29 July 2013). "Peace talks set to begin after Israel agrees to free 104 Palestinian prisoners". The Washington Post. 
  70. ^ Berman, Lazar. (7 August 2013) US peace envoy to come to Israel next week. The Times of Israel. Retrieved on 14 August 2013.
  71. ^ AFP, 'US denies dismantling peace negotiators team,' Ynet, 6 May 2014.
  72. ^ Sanctions and suspended talks - Israel responds to Palestinian reconciliation - Retrieved 4 September 2014
  73. ^ Abbas to Submit 'Surprising' Proposal to Kerry - Retrieved 4 September 2014
  74. ^ a b US rejected Abbas's peace plan, PA says - Retrieved 4 September 2014
  75. ^ Abbas Peace Plan Calls for Israeli Withdrawal Within 3 Years - Retrieved 4 September 2014
  76. ^ Abbas' peace plan: Israeli withdrawal from West Bank within three years - Retrieved 4 September 2014
  77. ^ Abu Mazen’s Three-Year Peace Plan for Israel - Retrieved 4 September 2014
  78. ^ eport: Abbas peace plan calls for Israeli withdrawal from West Bank - Retrieved 4 September 2014
  79. ^ Abbas: If Security Council bid fails, we may end security cooperation with Israel - Retrieved 1 October 2014
  80. ^ Palestinian statehood bid fails at UN Security Council as US, Australia vote against
  81. ^ Palestinians sign up to join International Criminal Court
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  83. ^ Palestinians to ban sale of products from 6 major Israeli companies
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  90. ^ Al Tamimi, Jumana (26 August 2008). "'"Rice discusses 'shelf agreement. gulfnews. Retrieved 4 January 2014. 
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  94. ^ Israelis, Palestinians applaud Japanese development plan Associated Press via, 15 March 2007.


  1. ^ Three factors made Israel’s territorial offer less forthcoming than it initially appeared. First, the 91 percent land offer was based on the Israeli definition of the West Bank, but this differs by approximately 5 percentage points from the Palestinian definition. Palestinians use a total area of 5,854 square kilometers. Israel, however, omits the area known as No Man's Land (50 sq. km near Latrun), post-1967 East Jerusalem (71 sq. km), and the territorial waters of the Dead Sea (195 sq. km), which reduces the total to 5,538 sq. km. Thus, an Israeli offer of 91 percent (of 5,538 sq. km) of the West Bank translates into only 86 percent from the Palestinian perspective.
    Jeremy Pressman, International Security, vol 28, no. 2, Fall 2003, "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?". On [4]. See pp. 16-17


See also

Arab–Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties

In March 2007, Japan proposed a plan for peace based on common economic development and effort, rather than on continuous wrangling over land. Both sides stated their support.[94] This became the Peace Valley plan, a joint effort of the Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian governments to promote economic cooperation, and new business initiatives which can help both sides work together, and create a better diplomatic atmosphere and better economic conditions. It is mainly designed to foster efforts in the private sector, once governments provide the initial investment and facilities.

In February 2006, Mordechai Ezra deHurst (nom de guerre/nom de plume) submitted a proposal to UNESCO Amman, Jordan for the establishment of a trade agreement between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians to mass manufacture the electric automobile and for the establishment of a UN Regional Human Rights - Terrorism Claims Court to be established in East Jerusalem that the rule of law be utilized to resolve claims which neither side wishes to abandon such as the border security, right of return, land claims, outlawing honor killings, a regional penal commission to review prisoner exchanges and the like. Under this proposal acts of terrorism would result in land forfeiture as a penalty, and all land disputes as well as human rights cases would be adjudicated in a UN Claims Court. Hurst's proposal has been revised to include protection of antiquities under the Anglo-American Treaty of 1924 and advocates that a "Peace and Reconciliation Summit" during the Feast of Tabernacles be held on the Temple Mount that as a gesture of peace the parties to the conflict agree to the rule of law to resolve their long standing dispute.

Despite the long history of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, there are many people working on peaceful solutions that respect the rights of peoples on both sides.

Joint economic effort and development

As things stand now this brings the process to another impasse. To avoid it some definition of what happens after a shelf agreement is needed. One possible idea by this essay is to agree ahead of time that following attainment of a final status agreement there will be a negotiated detailed and staged implementation agreement which would define a process which would allow the creation of a stable functional Palestinian state in stages and over time.[92] In Aug 2013 an indication that such an idea can be acceptable to the Palestinians was given by Mahmud Abbas in a meating with Meretz MK-s.[93] In the meeting Abbas stated "that there cannot be an interim agreement but only a final status deal that can be implemented in stages".

An attempt to change the rules was made by Condoleezza Rice and Tzipi Livni when they brought forth the concept of a shelf agreement.[90] The idea was to disengage the linkage between negotiations and actions on the ground. In theory this would allow negotiations until a "shelf agreement" defining peace would be obtained. Such an agreement would not entail implementation. It would just describe what peace is. It would stay on the shelf but eventually will guide the implementation. The difficulty with this notion is that it creates a dis-incentive for Israel to reach such an agreement. The lack of clarity about what happens after agreement is reached will result in insurmountable pressures on Abbas to demand immediate implementation. However, from the Israeli point of view, given the fact that the Palestinians are not ready to create a stable state, such an implementation process will almost guarantee instability in the Palestinian areas with a possible Hamas takeover as happened in Gaza.[91]

A common feature of all attempts to create a path which would lead to peace is the fact that more often than not promises to carry out "good will measures" were not carried out by both sides.[85] Furthermore, negotiations to attain agreement on the "final status" have been interrupted due to outbreak of hostilities. The result is that both Israelis and Palestinians have grown weary of the process. Israelis point out the fact that the Gaza Strip is fully controlled by the Hamas who do not want peace with a Jewish state.[86] According to the Israeli view, this limits the ability of the Palestinians to make peace with Israel and enforce it over the long term. Furthermore, in the Israeli view, a violent overtake of the West Bank by the Hamas as a result of the creation of an unstable new state is likely.[87] Lastly, rhetoric from high-ranking Fatah officials promising a full, literal Palestinian right of return into Israel (a position no Israeli government can accept without destroying the Jewish character of Israel) makes peace negotiations more difficult for both sides.[88] The Palestinians point out to the extensive and continuing Israeli settlement effort in the West Bank restricting the area available to the Palestinian state.[89]

Some difficulties with past peace processes

The Elon Peace Plan is a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict proposed in 2002 by former minister Binyamin Elon. The plan advocates the formal annexation of West Bank and Gaza by Israel and that Palestinians will be become either Jordanian citizens or permanent residents in Israel so long as they remained peaceful and law-abiding residents. All these actions should be done in agreement with Jordan and the Palestinian population. This solution is tied to the demographics of Jordan where it's claimed that Jordan is essentially already the Palestinian state, as it has so many Palestinian refugees and their descendants.[84]

Yet another approach was proposed by a number of parties inside and outside Israel: a "binational solution" whereby Israel would formally annex the Palestinian territories but would make the Palestinian Arabs citizens in a unitary secular state. Championed by Edward Said and New York University professor Tony Judt, the suggestion aroused both interest and condemnation. It was not actually a new idea, dating back as far as the 1920s, but it was given extra prominence by the growing demographic issues raised by a rapidly expanding Arab population in Israel and the territories. Considering the huge political and demographic issues that it would raise, however, it seems an improbable solution to the problem.

Another approach was taken by a team of negotiators led by former Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin, and former Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo following two and a half years of secret negotiations. On 1 December 2003, the two parties signed an unofficial suggested plan for peace in Geneva (dubbed the Geneva Accord). In sharp contrast to the road map, it is not a plan for a temporary ceasefire but a comprehensive and detailed solution aiming at all the issues at stake, in particular, Jerusalem, the settlements and the refugee problem. It was met with bitter denunciation by the Israeli government and many Palestinians, with the Palestinian Authority staying non-committal, but it was warmly welcomed by many European governments and some significant elements of the Bush Administration, including Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Alternative peace proposals

In December 2014, Jordan submitted the proposal to the UNSC, which failed when voted on later that month.[80] Later that month as previously threatened, Abbas signed the treaty to join the ICC.[81] Israel responded by freezing NIS 500 million ($127 million) in Palestinian tax revenues.[82] In response to the tax freeze, the PLO announced that they may dissolve the PA, leaving Israel fully responsible for both the West Bank and Gaza.[83]

Abbas stated that if Israel rejected the claim he would push for charges against Israel in the International Criminal Court over the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict.[78] Additionally if rejected, Abbas stated he would turn to the UN Security Council for unilateral measure for a Palestinian State.[74] On 1 October 2014 Abbas stated he would be presenting his plan to the UNSC within two to three weeks, with an application to the ICC to follow if it failed to pass the UNSC.[79]

The first three months of the plan would revolve around the borders and potential land swaps for the 1967 lines. The following six months would focus on issues including refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, security and water.[77]

On 25 August 2014, Abbas announced that he would be presenting to John Kerry a new proposal for the peace process;[73] on 3 September 2014 Abbas presented the proposal to John Kerry.[74] Abbas' plan calls for nine months of direct talks followed by a three-year plan for Israel to withdraw to the 1967 lines, leaving East Jerusalem as Palestine's capital.[75] As part of the plan, Israel will freeze all settlement construction as well as release the final batch of prisoners from the previous talks.[76]

Abbas' peace plan

The negotiations were scheduled to last up to nine months to reach a final status to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by mid-2014. They started in Washington, DC[69] and were slated to move to the King David Hotel in Jerusalem and finally to Hebron.[70] A deadline was set for establishing a broad outline for an agreement by 29 April 2014. On the expiry of the deadline, negotiations collapsed, with the US Special Envoy Indyk reportedly assigning blame mainly to Israel, while the US State Department insisting no one side was to blame but that "both sides did things that were incredibly unhelpful."[71] In April 2014, Israel suspended talks due to the new Palestinian Unity Government.[72]

Martin Indyk was appointed by the US to oversee the negotiations. Currently at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., during the Clinton administration he served as US ambassador to Israel, and was assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs.[67] Hamas, the Palestinian government in Gaza, rejected Kerry's announcement, stating that Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas has no legitimacy to negotiate in the name of the Palestinian people.[68]

Direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians began on 29 July 2013 following an attempt by United States Secretary of State John Kerry to restart the peace process.

2013–14 talks

This is in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution, first proposed in the 1980s. The mainstream within the PLO have taken the concept of territorial and diplomatic compromise seriously and have showed serious interest in this.[59] During the 2010 talks, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said that the Palestinians and Israel have agreed on the principle of a land swap, but Israel has yet to confirm. The issue of the ratio of land Israel would give to the Palestinians in exchange for keeping settlement blocs is an issue of dispute, with the Palestinians demanding that the ratio be 1:1, and Israel offering less.[60] In April 2012, Mahmoud Abbas sent a letter to Benjamin Netanyahu reiterating that for peace talks to resume, Israel must stop settlement building in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and accept the 1967 borders as a basis for a two-state solution.[61][62] In May 2012, Abbas reiterated his readiness to engage with the Israelis if they propose "anything promising or positive".[63] Netanyahu replied to Abbas' April letter less than a week later and, for the first time, officially recognised the right for Palestinians to have their own state, though as before[64] he declared it would have to be demilitarised,[65] and said his new national unity government furnished a new opportunity to renew negotiations and move forward.[66]

In September 2010, the Hamas and Hezbollah, however threatened violence, especially if either side seemed likely to compromise in order to reach an agreement. As a result, the Israeli government publicly stated that peace couldn't exist even if both sides signed the agreement, due to the stance taken by Hamas and Hezbollah. The US was therefore compelled to re-focus on eliminating the threat posed by the stance of Hamas and Hezbollah as part of the direct talk progress. Israel for its part, was skeptical that a final agreement was reached that the situation would change, as Hamas and Hezbollah would still get support to fuel new violence. In addition, the Israeli government rejected any possible agreement with Palestine as long as it refuses to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.

2010 direct talks

In June 2009, reacting to President Obama Barack's Cairo Address,[42] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared for the first time[53] conditional support for a future Palestinian state[54] but insisted that the Palestinians would need to make reciprocal gestures and accept several principles: recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people;demilitarization of a future Palestinian state, along with additional security guarantees, including defensible borders for Israel;[55] Palestinian would also have to accept that Jerusalem would remain the united capital of Israel, and renounce their claim to a right of return. He also claimed that Israeli settlements retain a right to growth and expansion in the West Bank. Palestinians rejected the proposals immediately.[56] Later that year, the White House announced that it would host a three-way meeting between President Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and President Mahmoud Abbas, in an effort to lay the groundwork for renewed negotiations on Mideast peace.

Following the conflict that erupted between the two main Palestinian parties, Fatah and Hamas, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip, splintering the Palestinian Authority into two polities, each claiming to be the true representatives of the Palestinian people. Fatah controlled the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank and Hamas governed in Gaza. Hostilities between Gaza and Israel increased. Egypt brokered the 2008 Israel–Hamas ceasefire, which lasted half a year beginning on 19 June 2008 and lasted until 19 December 2008.[52] The collapse of the ceasefire led to the Gaza War on 27 December 2008.

From December 2006 to mid-September 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority met 36 times; there were also lower-level talks. In 2007 Olmert welcomed the Arab League's re-endorsement of the Arab Peace Initiative. In his bid to negotiate a peace accord and establish a Palestinian state, Olmert proposed a plan to the Palestinians.[50] The centerpiece of Olmert's detailed proposal is the suggested permanent border, which would be based on an Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank. Olmert proposed annexing at least 6.3% of Palestinian territory, in exchange for 5.8% of Israeli land, with Palestinians receiving alternative land in the Negev, adjacent to the Gaza Strip, as well as territorial link, under Israeli sovereignty, for free passage between Gaza and the West Bank. Israel insisted on retaining an armed presence in the future Palestinian state.[42][51] Under Abbas's offer, more than 60 percent of settlers would stay in place. Olmert, for his part, was presenting a plan in which the most sparsely populated settlements would be evacuated. Olmert and Abbas both acknowledged that reciprocal relations would be necessary, not hermetic separation. They also acknowledged the need to share a single business ecosystem, while cooperating intensively on water, security, bandwidth, banking, tourism and much more. Regarding Jerusalem the leaders agreed that Jewish neighborhoods should remain under Israeli sovereignty, while Arab neighborhoods would revert to Palestinian sovereignty.[50] The Palestinians asked for clarifications of the territorial land swap since they were unable to ascertain what land his percentages affected, since Israeli and Palestinian calculations of the West Bank differ by several hundred square kilometres. For them, in lieu of such clarifications, Olmert's 6.3-6.8% annexation might work out closer to 8.5%, 4 times the 1.9% limit the Palestinians argued a swap should not exceed.[42] The talks ended with both sides claiming the other side dropped follow-up contacts.[42][51]

Israeli–Palestinian talks in 2007 and 2009

The plan called for independent actions by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with disputed issues put off until a rapport can be established. In the first step, the Palestinian Authority must "undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere" and a "rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus" must "begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure." Israel was then required to dismantle settlements established after March 2001, freeze all settlement activity, remove its army from Palestinian areas occupied after 28 September 2000, end curfews and ease restrictions on movement of persons and goods.

In July 2002, the "quartet" of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia outlined the principles of a "road map" for peace, including an independent Palestinian state. The road map was released in April 2003 after the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas (AKA Abu Mazen) as the first-ever Palestinian Authority Prime Minister. Both the US and Israel called for a new Prime Minister position, as both refused to work with Arafat anymore.

President Peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel, left, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Aqaba, Jordan, 4 June 2003.

The "Road Map" for peace

The Beirut summit of Arab government leaders took place in March 2002 under the aegis of the Arab League. The summit concluded by presenting a plan to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres welcomed it and said, "... the details of every peace plan must be discussed directly between Israel and the Palestinians, and to make this possible, the Palestinian Authority must put an end to terror, the horrifying expression of which we witnessed just last night in Netanya", [3] referring to the Netanya suicide attack perpetrated on the previous evening which the Beirut Summit failed to address. Israel was not prepared to enter negotiations as called for by the Arab League plan on the grounds that it did not wish for "full withdrawal to 1967 borders and the right of return for the Palestinian refugees".[49]

Beirut summit

At the Taba summit (at Taba) in January 2001 talks continued based on the Clinton Parameters. The Israeli negotiation team presented a new map. The proposition removed the "temporarily Israeli controlled" areas from the West Bank, and the Palestinian side accepted this as a basis for further negotiation. However, Prime Minister Ehud Barak did not conduct further negotiations at that time; the talks ended without an agreement and the following month the right-wing Likud party candidate Ariel Sharon was elected as Israeli prime minister in February 2001.

Proposed in the Fall of 2000 following the collapse of the Camp David talks, The Clinton Parameters included a plan on which the Palestinian State was to include 94-96% of the West Bank, and around 80% of the settlers were to become under Israeli sovereignty, and in exchange for that, Israel would concede some territory (so called 'Territory Exchange' or 'Land Swap') within the Green Line (1967 borders). The swap would consist of 1-3% of Israeli territory, such that the final borders of the West Bank part of the Palestinian state would include 97% of the land of the original borders.[48]

Clinton's "Parameters" and the Taba talks

President Arafat rejected this offer and did not propose a counter-offer. No tenable solution was crafted which would satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian demands, even under intense U.S. pressure. Clinton blamed Arafat for the failure of the Camp David Summit. In the months following the summit, Clinton appointed former Mitchell Report.

In 2000, US President Bill Clinton convened a peace summit between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. In May of that year, according to Nathan Thrall, Israel had offered Palestinians 66% of the West Bank, with 17% annexed to Israel, and a further 17% not annexed but under Israeli control, and no compensating swap of Israeli territory.[42] The Israeli prime minister reportedly[43] offered the Palestinian leader approximately 95% of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip[note 1] if 69 Jewish settlements (which comprise 85% of the West Bank's Jewish settlers) be ceded to Israel. East Jerusalem would have fallen for the most part [44] under Israeli sovereignty, with the exception of most suburbs with heavy non-Jewish populations surrounded by areas annexed to Israel.[45][46] The issue of the Palestinian right of return would be solved through significant monetary reparations.[47] According to Palestinian sources, the remaining area would be under Palestinian control. Depending on how the security roads would be configured, these Israeli roads might impede free travel by Palestinians throughout their proposed nation and reduce the ability to absorb Palestinian refugees. Borders, airspace, and water resources of the Palestinian state would have been left in Israeli hands.[46]

Camp David 2000 Summit

The Wye River Memorandum was a political agreement negotiated to implement the Oslo Accords, completed on 23 October 1998. It was signed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. It was negotiated at Wye River, MD (at the Wye River Conference Center) and signed at the White House with President Bill Clinton as the official witness. On 17 November 1998, Israel's 120-member parliament, the Knesset, approved the Wye River Memorandum by a vote of 75-19. The agreement dealt with further redeployments in the West Bank, security issues and other concerns.

Wye River Memorandum

Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, also known as The Hebron Protocol or Hebron Agreement, began 7 January and was concluded from 15 January to 17 January 1997 between Israel and the PLO. This agreement dealt with the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron in accordance with the Oslo Accords. The agreement dealt with redeployments in Hebron, security issues and other concerns.

Hebron agreement

Newly elected Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared a new policy following the many suicide attacks by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad since 1993, including a wave of suicide attacks prior to the Israeli elections of May 1996. Netanyahu declared a tit-for-tat policy which he termed "reciprocity," whereby Israel would not engage in the peace process if Arafat continued with what Netanyahu defined as the Palestinian revolving door policy, i.e., incitement and direct or indirect support of terrorism. The Hebron and Wye Agreements were signed during this period, after Israel considered that its conditions were partially met.

1996–99 agreements

After the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, the peace process eventually ground to a halt. The settlements' population almost doubled in the West Bank. Later suicide bombing attacks from Palestinian militant groups and the subsequent retaliatory actions from the Israeli military made conditions for peace negotiations untenable.

Various "transfers of power and responsibilities" in the Gaza Strip and West Bank from Israel to the Palestinians took place in the mid-1990s.[41] The Palestinians achieved self-governance of major cities in the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip. Israel maintained and continues to maintain a presence in the West Bank for security reasons, in 2013 Israel still has control of 61% of the West Bank, but the Palestinians control civic functions for most of the Palestinian population.

The slowpaced Madrid talks were upstaged by a series of secret meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators hosted by Norway. These meetings produced the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Palestinians and Israel, a plan discussing the necessary elements and conditions for a future Palestinian state "on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338".[40] The agreement, officially titled the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), was signed on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993. Rabin, Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres were awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts. On behalf of the Israeli people, Rabin said: "We who have fought against you, the Palestinians, we say to you today, in a loud and a clear voice, enough of blood and tears ... enough!"

Oslo (1993–)

In 1991, just after the Secretary of State James Baker) called a conference in Madrid, Spain between Israel and the Arab nations "directly involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict ... which ... was to serve only as a preamble to direct bilateral and multilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors", dubbed the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991.[39] Talks continued in Washington, DC, but with few results.

Yitzhak Rabin, Bill Clinton, and Yasser Arafat at the Oslo Accords signing ceremony on 13 September 1993

Madrid (1991–93)

No breakthrough occurred even after President Sadat in 1972 surprised most observers by suddenly expelling Soviet military advisers from Egypt and again signaled to the United States government his willingness to negotiate based on the Rogers plan.

In 1970, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers proposed the Rogers Plan, which called for a 90-day cease-fire, a military standstill zone on each side of the Suez Canal, and an effort to reach agreement in the framework of UN Resolution 242. The Egyptian government accepted the Rogers Plan even before Anwar Sadat became president. Israel refused to enter negotiations with Egypt based on the Rogers peace plan.

There were parallel efforts for peace treaties between Israel and other "confrontation states": Egypt, Jordan and Syria after the Six-Day war, and Lebanon afterwards.[36][37] UN resolution 242 was accepted by Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, but rejected by Syria until 1972-1973.[38]

Peace efforts with confrontation states

The Palestinian Declaration of Independence of 15 November 1988, which referenced the UN Partition Plan of 1947 and "UN resolutions since 1947" in general, was interpreted as an indirect recognition of the State of Israel, and support for a two-state solution. The Partition Plan was invoked to provide legitimacy to Palestinian statehood. Subsequent clarifications were taken to amount to the first explicit Palestinian recognition of Israel.[34][35]

Security Council resolutions dating back to June 1976 supporting the two-state solution based on the pre-1967 lines were vetoed by the United States,[32] which argued that the borders must be negotiated directly by the parties. The idea has had overwhelming support in the UN General Assembly since the mid-1970s.[33]

The first indication that the PLO would be willing to accept a two-state solution, on at least an interim basis, was articulated by Said Hammami in the mid-1970s.[30][31]

PLO acceptance of two-state solution

In September 1974, 56 Member States proposed that “the question of Palestine” be included as an item in the General Assembly’s agenda. In a resolution adopted on 22 November 1974, the General Assembly affirmed Palestinian rights, which included the "right to self-determination without external interference", "the right to national independence and sovereignty", and the "right to return to their homes and property". These rights have been affirmed every year since.[28]:24[29]


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